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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Political Economy Workshop (Gov 3007)
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SUMMARY:Political Economy Workshop (Gov 3007)
DESCRIPTION:-------- DATE:  -------------------------------------------------------------    12:00pm to 2:00pm    -------- LOCATION:  ---------------------------------------------------------    K354  Presentations given by Arthur Silve - \'Democratic spillovers – rent-seeking   elites, mobile assets, and the coevolution of political institutions,\'    Mauricio Fernandez Duque - \'Anticipating Others Wrongly: Pluralistic   Ignorance and Underestimating Embarrassment,\'    *Abstract for \'Democratic spillovers – rent-seeking elites, mobile assets,   and the coevolution of political institutions\'*  This paper discusses the political consequences of international asset   mobility. Within a given country, the elite can extract rents from the pro-   duction sector, and they also produce themselves. The rents extracted are   distortive, and the elite face a tradeoff between extractive or efficient   poli- cies. Factor mobility favors more efficient, and less extractive   policies. The model yields several predictions. When the masses are mobile,   political in- clusiveness spills over from abroad, and rents are limited.   Conversely, if the elite are mobile, but the masses are captive, political   inclusiveness abroad buttresses the elite and favors political polarization.   Such a model provides interesting insights in the role of liberal democracies   abroad. First, they set up an international context in which patrimonial   regimes thrive, and in which their own economic and political outcomes are   negatively affected. Second, tax evasion is shown to be a necessary outcome   of asymmetric asset mobility in big countries. Such countries, including but   not limited to OECD coun- tries, favor the emergence and stability of tax   havens, with negative political consequences at home.   *Abstract for \'Anticipating Others Wrongly: Pluralistic Ignorance and   Underestimating Embarrassment\':*    Pluralistic ignorance is a situation in which individuals are act- ing in a   certain way out of their misconceived notions of what others want. Although   the concept was developed by psychologists, it has been used in political   science to explain the sudden outbreak of rev- olutions and persistent public   opinions. In this paper, I argue that past models of pluralistic ignorance   have ignored a crucial element: that individuals are acting out of perceived   social expectations, which are themselves formed through observed actions. I   introduce a novel game-theoretic model of pluralistic ignorance with this   feature, and argue that it poses a puzzle: the likelihood of pluralistic   ignorance vanishes as the number of individuals increases. In order to   explain how pluralistic ignorance can be maintained in large populations, I   introduce an inferential bias that is often alluded to in the psychol- ogy   literature: individuals underestimate others’ embarassment when making   their decisions.    subscribe [1] iCal [2]    [1] webcal://www.iq.harvard.edu/calendar/export.ics/279031  [2] http://www.iq.harvard.edu/calendar/export.ics/279031
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STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20150202T170000Z
DTEND:20150202T190000Z
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